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ment in any event to the mortgagee, it is submitted that a statute in the
nature of the one in Alabama would best serve the interests of both. It
should include, in addition, a clause providing that only so much property
should be sold as is necessary to satisfy the debt then due. Under such
a statute partial foreclosure would then operate to cut off the lien of
the mortgage in one case: that is, where only a portion of the debt had
matured and the-mortgagee foreclosed on the whole property without
preserving the lien.
LEImUEL H. GiBBONS
Workmen's Compensation-Falls Due to Dizzinessf Vertigo,
Epilepsy and Like Causes
It was recently held by the Georgia Court of Appeals that a fractured
skull sustained by a department store salesman, when he suffered an
epileptic attack and fell against a sharp cornered table, was an accident
arising out o.f the employment. The State Board of Workmen's Com-
pensation granted the award on a finding that the exertion of the work
brought on the attack.1 Without rejecting the finding of the Board, the
Court rather ambitiously advanced an entirely different theory. It was
said that irrespective of whether the exertion taused the attack, the in-
jury was compensable, since the table which claimant struck constituted
a "special hazard" of the employment.2 That anything so common-
place as a table should be denominated a "special hazard" and made the
basis of liability for an injury may shock those employers who are not
aware of some of the recent trends in workmen's compensation.
The Georgia statutes8 do not make the employer liable for every
accident which happens while the worker is on the job, but require the
employment in some manner contribute to the injury. In theory, at
1 The finding of exertion was not based on any immediate act, instead the whole
nature of the employment was examined, which included climbing stairs and stand-
ing for a ten-hour work day.
Note that North Carolina apparently requires some particular act of exertion
beyond the usual requirements of the employment. Neely v. Statesville, 212 N. C.
365, 193 S. E. 664 (1937) ; Moore v. Engineering & Sales Co., 214 N. C. 424, 199
S. E. 605 (1938) ; For annotations of N. C. Industrial Comnmission decisions, see
N. C. W. C. A. Ann. (1946) p. 25-26. But see Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing
Co., 227 N. C. 184, 187, 41 S. E. 2d 592, 594 (1947) (concurring opinion).
'United States Casualty Co. v. Richardson, - Ga. App. -, 43 S. E. 2d 793
(1947). Compare language of same court twelve years before where workman
fainted and fell at water fountain. The decision was found not to be in "conflict
with the main case. "The better and more generally followed rule would seem to
be that followed by Judge Stanley of the Department of Industrial Relations, to
the effect that an injury arising from a physical seizure not induced by or related
to the employment is not such an accident as would afford compensation, even
though it might appear that the particular consequences of the seizure were such
as would not have resulted elsewhere than at the place of the employment." Bibb
Mfg. Co. v. Alford, 51 Ga. App. 277, 179 S. E. 912, 914 (1935).
' GA. CODE ANN. (Park, 1937) §114-102 (1935). "'Injury' and 'personal in-jury' shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment...."
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least, this contributing factor must be one peculiar to the employment
and not common to the general public. 4 The courts, torn between a
desire to construe the statute liberally in favor of the employee, and at
the same time bedeviled with common law notions of proximate cause,
have not always reached uniform nor logical decisions.
In early cases where an -employee's fall was brought on solely by a
personal disease,5 compensation was granted only when the employment
required the worker to be in such a position or location that any fall
would result in almost certain injury. This "location doctrine" seems
to stem from an English case -where an epileptic fell into a hatchway
near which his employment required him to stand.0 The case was fol-
lowed in American courts where a painter became dizzy and fell eleven
feet from a scaffold,7 where a factory worker fell into a nearby machine
from a heart attack, 8 and where an epileptic fell into a pit of hot ashes.9
The "special hazard" of these situations was apparent. However, some
American courts took the view that although the distance one fell or
the object one fell against might increase the injury, it did not change
the liability for a fall caused by a personal condition of the employee.o
The courts which accepted the "location doctrine," rationalized that the
fall itself constituted an accident and was the immediate proximate cause
of the injuries. If the employment in any manner increased the risk or
contributed to the injury, then the original cause of the fall, i.e., the
physical condition of the employee, was too remote for the court to
consider.." Simply put, the difference in the two theories seems to be,
"But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment
as a contributing proximate cause, and comes frbm a hazard to which the work-
men would have been equally exposed apart from the employment. The causative
danger must be peculiar to the work, and not common to the neighborhood." Lib-
erty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Neal, 55 Ga. App. 790, 191 S. E. 393, 399 (1937).
'To be distinguished are cases where the employee falls from some known
cause connected with the employment, and not from a personal condition. In
such cases, compensation is almost universally given. Horovitz, Current Trends
in Workmen's Compensation, 12 LAW SocIr JOURNAL 611, 649 (1947).
8Wiks v. Dowell & Co., 2 K. B. 225 (1905); Accord, Wilson v. Chatterton,
K. B. 360 (1946) (Agriculture worker had epileptic fit, fell into furrow half full
of water and drowned). Contra: Butler v. Burton-on-Trent Union, 106 L. T. N. S.
824, 5 B. W. C. C. 355 (1912) (where employee suffering from tuberculosis, in
fit of coughing fell down stairways).
7 Gonier v. Chase Companies, 97 Conn. 46, 115 At. 677 (1921).
'Dow's Case, 231'Mass. 348, 121 N. E. 19 (1918).
" Rockford Hotel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 300 Ill. 87, 132 N. E. 759(1921). For annotations of many cases see: 19 A. L. R. 95; 28 A. L. R. 204;
60 A. L. R. 1299; 5 ScaNmDER, WonxmaN's COMPENSATION TmXT §1376 (3d ed.
1946) ; Horovitz, Current Trends in Workmen's Compensation, 12 LAw SociETr
JouNAL. 611, 649 (1947).
"
0Cox v. Kansas City Refining Co., 108 Kan. 320, 195 Pac. 863, 19 A. L. R. 90
(1921) (epileptic fell on hot pipes) ; Van Gorder v. Packard Motor Car Co., 195.
Mich. 588, 163 N. W. 107 (1917) (epileptic fell off scaffold) ; Brooker v. Indus-
trial Commission, 176 Cal. 275, 168 Pac. 126 (1917) (epileptic fell thirty-nine feet
off scaffold).
"' See note 9 supra.
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that in the former the court isolates the reason for the fall and looks
solely to the injury, while in the latter, the court examines only the
factors producing the fall and ignores the injury. Obviously, the cor-
rect rule depends on the particular fact situation. If the employment
truly creates a "special hazard" which enhances the injuries, an award
of compensation is proper. The great majority of courts today hold
that falls from purely personal physical conditions are compensable if
from a height, on a stairway, or against any object.12  But what of a
fall to the bare floor,'3 or against some objects found in every home?
How then, can the fall. be said to be an "accident arising out of the
employment"? Perhaps the only answer is in the often repeated state-
ment "that this, is an act for the giving and not the withholding of
compensation."' 4 But with only this guide the decisions are likely to
go .to ridiculous lengths. The court which finds that a concrete floor is
more apt, to cause an injury than one of wood, will soon be called on to
determine that oak is harder than pine, that pine is harder than rubber
and ad absurdum. Unfortunately, many courts continue to give lip
service to the term, "special hazard" and find in these situations that
except for the employment the particular consequences of the accident
would not have occurred. New terms such as "contributing cause" 1'
and "concurring cause"' 6 have flourished but have added little to the
formulation of a clear test.
Some courts have revised their definitions of "arising out of' to in-
clude not just "special hazards" of the employment, but also risks which
are common to the general public, and which in hindsight can be said
to have contributed to the injury.'7 But once the test of "special haz-
ard" is abandoned, the courts are in effect striking from the statutes the
phrase "arising out of." While such a step would no doubt eliminate
"
2National Automobile & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,
75 Cal. App. 2d 677, 171 P. 2d 594 (1946) (epileptic fell against sawhorse--court
in reviewing many cases said overwhelming majority favor compensation where
the injury is contributed to by some factor peculiar to the employment, even though
the fall has its origin in some idiopathy of the employee) ; Connelly v. Samaritan
Hospital, 259 N. Y. 137, 181 N. E. 76 (1932) (fall against a laundry table due to
cardiac condition) ; Tavey v. Industrial Commission, 106 Utah 479, 150 P. 2d 379
(1944) (fainted and fell against bookshelf). For annotations of recent cases, see
5 SCHNEIDER, WORKM.EN'S COMPENSATION TEXT §1376 (3d ed. 1946).
" National Automobile & Casualty Ins.'Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,
75 Cal. App. 2d 677, 171 P. 2d 594 (1946) (court says states are about evenly
divided where fall is to bare floor).
24 62 L. Q. REv. 300, 301 (1946).
" Reynolds v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Commission, 130 N. J. L. 437, 33 A.
2d 595 (1943), aft'd, 131 N. 3. L. 327, 36 A. 2d 429 (1944).
4 Connelly v. Samaritan Hospital, 259 N. Y. 137, 181 N. E. 76 (1932).
Saag v. St. Arden's Church, 122 Conn. 343, 350, 189 Adl. 599, 601 (1937);
Connelly v. Samaritan Hospital, 259 N. Y. 137, 181 N. E. 76 (1932) ; accord,
Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 62 Ariz. 398, 409; 158 P. 2d
511, 516 (1945). Sce Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Dehn, 110 Ind. App. 483,
493, 39 N. E. 2d 499, 507 (1942).
[Vol. 26
NOTES AND COMMENTS
much litigation, it would make the employer the insurer of his employees
subject to falls from idiopathic conditions. Any fall, while on the
job, resulting in injury would be compensable. Without concern as to
whether the Workmen's Compensation Statute' should be so extended,
it seems clear that the matter should be left to the legislatures and not
to the courts.
The marked trend towards greater liberality in this field is particu-
larly noticeable from an examination of the decisions of the North
Carolina Industrial Commission over the last fifteen years. In 1931,
when a filling station employee had a convulsion and fell into a showcase,
the Commission found the resulting injuries did not arise out of a risk
incident to the employment.' 8 Similar results were reached when
workers fell due to faintihg,19 cerebral hemorrhages, 20 and dizziness.21
In 1935, however, compensation was allowed where a worker became
dizzy and fell from a roof.22 And in 1940, the Commission clarified
their position by stating that when the employment subjects the worker
to especial danger from falls, injuries received thereby are compensable,
"irrespective of whether or not the condition of the employee, which
originally set in motion the dangerous hazard of the employment was
foreign or connected with his employment. ' 23  The gamut was com-
pleted in 1946 when the Commission said it was immaterial whether an
epileptic seizure caused a worker to fall backwards on a cement floor,
since the cement constituted a "special hazard" and a greater risk thdn
the worker would have been subjected. to outside the employment.24
It is not entirely clear just -where the North Carolina Supreme Court
stands in this controversial field in the absence of a decision directly
in point. When a fire chief, during a fire, collapsed on a stairway from
a heart attack, compensation was denied since the court could find no
accident. 25 But when a millworker fell backwards from some unde-
termined cause, compensation was allowed. It was pointed out that
when the cause of a fall is unknown it is presumptive that it arose out
of the employment. 26 In a dictum the court distinguished cases where
the fall was due to a physical infirmity or some other force external to
" Boyette v. Thompson-Wooten Oil Co., 2 I. C. 378 (1938).
" Beam v. Presbyterian Hospital, 4995 (1935) N. C. W. C. A. Ann. (1946)
p. 24.2 Kirkman v. Greensboro, 8530 (1939) N. C. W. C. A. Ann. (1946) p. 24.
"
1 Cooke v. Roanoke Mills Co. No. 2, A-1288 (1942) N. C. W. C. A. Ann.
(1946) p. 24.
"'Garland v. Bordner & Co., 4809 (1935) N. C. W. C. A. Ann. (1946) p. 24.
" Howard v. J. L. Miller, 9324 (1940) N. C. W. C. A. Ann. (1946) p. 24.2 Record, p. 61, Devine v. Dave Steel Co., 227 N. C. 684, 44 S. E. 2d 77
(1947).
"' Neely v. Statesville, 212 N. C. 365, 193 S. E. 664 (1937) (evidence that death
was due to the heart attack instead of the fall).
" Robbins v. Bossong Hosiery Mills, 220 N. C. 246, 17 S. E. 2d 20 (1941).
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the employment.27 In 1946, the court handed down a decision which
appears to overrule that dictum; in fact the Georgia court in the prin-
cipal case cited the North Carolina decision as supporting the theory
of compensation for a fall irrespective of its cause if the employment
enhances the injuries. In that case an employee, suffering from a dis-
ease which caused fainting, fell from the window of a washroom on the
eleventh floor of an office building. While there was at least strong
circumstantial evidence that the deceased fainted, the hearing commis-
sion found as a fact, based on investigations conducted ten months later,
thaf in an effort to get air at the open window, the deceased slipped on
the "very slick tile floor" which constituted a "special hazard." On
appeal the court treated this as a case of first impression.and favorably
reviewed cases from other jurisdictions where compensation had been
granted for falls due to idiopathic diseases.28 But it should be noted
these cases are distinguishable in light of the findings of the commission.
Here, the slippery floor, not the disease, caused the fall and compensa-
tion could have been granted by virtue of the "special hazard." 20 Unless
one is to believe that the court was dissatisfied with the finding of.facts
of the commission and felt that the fall was actually the results of
fainting, it is difficult to see why the court relied on a line of decisions
to. support. that point.
A 1947 decision has failed to throw any light on the position of the
North Carolina Supreme Court.' In this case a watchman, while lower-
ing a flag, fell backwards onto the cement on which he was standing,
and received a fractured skull from which he never regained conscious-
ness. Although there was evidence that deceased suffered from epilepsy,
the commission rejected any inference that this fall was the results of
an epileptic attack. Instead the cause of the fall was left undetermined,
but the-commission found death arose out of the employment because
deceased was required to stand-on cement.30 The court, without adopt-
ing all of the reasons assigned by the commission, affirmed the award.31
Since the cause of the fall was unexplained the court was not called on
27 "If, however the cause is known and is independent of, unrelated to, and
apart from the employment-the results of a hazard to which others are equally
exposed-compensation will not be allowed." Robbins v. Bossong Hosiery Mills,
220 N. C. 246, 248, 17 S. E. 2d 20, 22 (1941).
"Rewis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 226 N. C. 325, 38 S. E. 2d 197 (1946).
"EHowell v. Standard Ice & Fuel Co., 226 N. C. 730, 40 S. E. 2d 197 (1946)
(fell from trestle); Brown v. Carolina Aluminum Co., 224 N. C. 766, 32 S. E.
2d 320 (1944) (pushed backward on cement floor by fellow worker) ; Gorden v.
Thomasville Chair Co., 205 N. C. 739, 172 S. E. 485 (1934) (slipped on ice);
Clark v. Carolina Cotton & Woolen Mills, 204 N. C. 529, 168 S. E. 816 (1933)
(slipped on stairway).
:8 Record, p. 37, Devine v. Dave Steel Co., 227 N. C. 684, 44 S. E. 2d 77
(1947) (There was expert medical testimony that a fall onto concrete is more
likely to produce a fractured skull than one onto dirt.).3 Devine v. Dave Steel Co., 227 N. C. 684, 44 S. E. 2d 77 (1947).
[Vol. 26
NOTES AND COMMENTS
to decide the effect of a fall which resulted from a condition personal
to the employee.3 2
However, one gathers. from the tenor of these decisions that the
court is willing to go along with a liberal interpretation of the Work-
men's Compensation Act. Until an employee survives his fall and gives
direct testimony as to the cause, leaving no room for favorable pre-
sumptions or fact finding based on circumstantial evidence, we can only
guess as to *the real position of the court. But if one can rely on dicta
and the overall trend toward liberality, it seems probable that any fall
resulting in injuries will be compensable in the future. It will be in-
teresting to see how long the court can reconcile such awards with their
traditional requirement that for injury to arise out of the employment it
must be by a peculiar risk, uncommon to the general public. 3 Liability
without fault has become generally accepted, but it now appears em-
ployers are facing liability without practical means of avoidance.8 4
Some employers may find the only alternative to upholstering their
entire premises will be to refuse to hire those suffering from physical
infirmities.8 5
GEoRGE M. McDERmoTT,.JR.
"Robbins v. Bossong Hosiery Mills, 220 N. C. 246, 17 S. E. 2d 20 (1941).
"Bryant v. T. A. Loving Co., 222 N. C. 724, 24 S. E. 2d 751 (1943) ; Lockey
v. Cohen, Goldman & Co., 213 N. C. 356, 196 S. E. 342 (1938); Pleminons v.
White's Service Inc., 213 N. C. 148, 195 S. E. 370 (1938).
"Much the same trend has occurred where the injury is on the street or by
act of God. "The street hazard constitutes a well-recognized relaxation of this
rule: If an employee has been sent out on the streets and sustains an injury there,
he can recover compensation, although, he was exposed to no more danger than
the general public on the streets at the time." Note, 20 TEx L. REV. 387, 388
(1942); See Note, 23 N. C. L. REv. 159 -(1945). For examples of injury by
act of God, see Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 26 N. E. 2d 328 (1940) (when
hurricane caused wall of factory to fall on employee, compensation allowed even
though it was conceded that, by remaining in the brick building, employee was
subjected to less hazard than he would have been at home). For recent cases see
Horovitz, Current Trends in Workinens Compensation, 12 LAw SOCIETY JOU.NAL
466, 511 (1947).
" 42 Science N. L. 307 (1942) (It is estimated that there are 350,000 epileptics
in the United States, two thirds of whom are capable of doing useful work, but
can't get jobs because many employers fear they will be made liable for the con-
sequences of an attack while on the job. It is estimated that more than 15% of
the brain injuries of the last war, will result in epilepsy.).
1948]
